## 1AC

#### PLAN: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase loan guarantees for nuclear power plants built in high socio-economic areas in the United States

### Energy Apartheid

Companies seek lower income communities to site nuclear power plants because they are eager for economic growth.

Lazarus ‘92

Richard J. Lazarus Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri PURSUING "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE": THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SPRING, 1992 87 Nw. U.L. Rev. 787

n88. In commenting on a public utility company's decision to site a nuclear power plant in the economically depressed community of Plymouth, Massachusetts, a company official reportedly referred directly to the relevance of the socioeconomic status of the town's residents to the company's decision: "The town is sort of down on its uppers; it's sort of poor. When we announced it, they said, "Oh, Santa Claus came.' They are a better kind of people to deal with ...." Peter Yeager, The Limits of the Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution 87 (1991). On the other hand, the promise of economic benefits in exchange for environmental pollution may be more illusory than real. Although the pollution and associated environmental risks will no doubt occur, there is reason to suspect that many of the higher paying jobs in fact do not go to those in the community, but to nonminority persons who reside outside the immediate vicinity of the polluting facility. See Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 69, 70.

#### The aff is not an attempt to dictate what marginalized communities need – rather it questions the current method of siting potentially risky power sources. Closing the neoliberal distance between decision makers and the impacts of their decision gets at the heart of why these siting problems occur. We cannot wait for people to do the right thing.

Yamamoto and Lyman 1

Eric K, Hawaii Law School law prof., and Jen-L W, UC Berkeley visiting law prof., University of Colorado Law Review, 72 U. Colo. L. Rev. 311, Spring, p. 311-313, ln

The framework, however, at times also undercuts environmental justice struggles by racial and indigenous communities because it tends to foster misassumptions about race, culture, sovereignty, and the importance of distributive justice. Those misassumptions sometimes lead environmental justice scholars and activists to miss what is of central importance to affected communities.¶ The first misassumption is that for all racialized groups in all situations, a hazard-free physical environment is their main, if not only, concern. [n47](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n47) Environmental justice advocates foster this notion by placing emphasis on "high quality environments" [n48](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n48) and the adverse health effects caused by exposure to air pollutants and hazardous waste materials.¶ [\*321] Not all facility sitings that pose health risks, however, warrant full-scale opposition by host communities. Some communities, on balance, are willing to tolerate these facilities for the economic benefits they confer or in lieu of the cultural or social disruption that might accompany large-scale remedial efforts. Other communities, struggling to deal with joblessness, inadequate education, and housing discrimination, indeed with daily survival, prefer to devote most of their limited time and political capital to those challenges. In these situations, racial and indigenous communities may have pressing needs and long-range goals beyond the re-siting of polluting facilities. [n49](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n49)¶ For example, as Native communities endeavor to ameliorate conditions of poverty and social dislocation by encouraging the economic development of tribal lands, some increasingly find themselves in conflict with environmentalists, who are sometimes but not always environmental justice advocates. In the mining industry, several Native American tribes are attempting to tap mineral resources on their reservations. [n50](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n50) Urged by the increased emphasis on economic self-determination in federal Native American policy in the 1970s, the tribes formed the Council of Energy Resource Tribes to deal [\*322] with both the siting of new mines on Native American lands and the environmental and the cultural problems that might result. [n51](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n51) Those efforts met stiff opposition from some environmental groups concerned mainly with land degradation and pollution. The environmentalists' seeming lack of understanding of the economic and cultural complexity of the Native American groups' decisions have led some Native Americans to express cynicism about environmentalists who sometimes treat them as mascots for the environmental cause. [n52](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n52)¶ The established framework also assumes that fair distribution of physical burdens is the primary, if not sole, means of achieving environmental justice. Sheila Foster rejects this assumption as "monolithic" [n53](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n53) and "one-dimensional," [n54](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n54) focusing "too much on outcomes and not enough on the processes that produce those outcomes." [n55](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n55) According to Foster, by not addressing why racial communities are overexposed to pollution, hazardous waste sites, and poisoned fish stocks, agencies like the EPA fail to confront: "discriminatory housing and real estate policies and practices, residential segregation and limited residential choices influenced by such discrimination, discriminatory zoning regulations and ineffective land use policies, racial disparities in the availability of jobs and municipal services, imbalances in political access and power, and "white flight.'" [n56](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n56)¶ The established framework's prescription of the public's role is also limited. Under the pluralist model, since "preferences are defined by the relative power of self-interested subjects[,] they may be distorted by existing inequalities, poorly construed as a result of exclusion and unequal political clout or prove simply unethical." [n57](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n57) Since "environmental justice challenges reside in an ethical dimension beyond" [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n58) utilitarian choices, the pluralism model cannot resolve all problems associated with environmental racism.¶ [\*323] The civic republican model may seem "intuitively better equipped to respond to the ethical claim of environmental justice" [n59](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n59) by depending on a discourse of the "common good." But, critics ask, how realistic is it to believe that self-interested groups will sacrifice their economic self-interest to an often vaguely defined "common good"? [n60](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n60) The "common good," furthermore, is an elastic concept, expanding and contracting depending upon historical, social, and cultural context and power disparities within a community. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348080173825&returnToKey=20_T15565693953&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.92817.33560959937" \l "n61)

#### Current siting strategies for nuclear power plants create epistemological distance between governmental and corporate decision makers and the disadvantaged communities where the plants are built.

Kevin ‘97

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Conflicts over LULU siting can be lessened by lowering the number of LULUs that must be sited, for example, through waste reduction and recycling efforts. However, some irreducible number of LULUs must be sited somewhere. Most environmental justice advocates argue that minority populations should not host LULUs to a greater extent than their percentage of the population. [n201](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n201) Few advocates have been explicit regarding the proportion of LULUs that should be hosted by white communities. However, while many advocates disclaim an intention to preferentially site LULUs in non-minority communities, [n202](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n202) environmental justice rationales and remedies exert strong pressures against locating LULUs in minority areas. As stated by two commentators, "most of the environmental justice initiatives now being considered attempt to alleviate environmental inequities by forcing polluting and waste facilities to operate in wealthier, non-minority areas." [n203](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n203) [\*157] ¶ Preferential siting in white communities can be justified in several ways. It can be argued, for example, that minorities should bear lesser burdens in order to compensate for past discrimination in LULU siting in particular, or for past and on-going generalized discrimination. In this conception, a fair distribution of LULUs requires "advantaged" neighborhoods to bear a greater share of LULUs than minority neighborhoods to make up for past discrimination against minorities. Since minority communities also suffer disproportionately from ills other than LULUs, such as poorer health and less mobility, to help equalize the overall burdens borne by different communities, and to distribute impacts equally, a relatively larger share of LULUs should be sited in non-minority neighborhoods. [n204](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n204)¶ Probably more important than theoretical justifications, however, are bureaucratic and political considerations. There are presently no formal federal prohibitions against siting LULUs in minority neighborhoods. However, bureaucracies with environmental justice responsibilities are being created in each agency, [n205](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n205) and due to Executive Order 12,898 and other pressures, federal siting proposals which impact minority communities come under a higher level of scrutiny than do proposals which impact primarily white areas. This creates incentives for project managers to favor siting in non-minority areas. [n206](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n206)¶ Depending upon the evolution of laws, regulations and court cases, incentives could also be created for private sector actors to site LULUs in non-minority areas. Persons opposing the siting of LULUs in minority areas could have new grounds for legal challenges, with lawsuits against siting in minority areas encouraged. The concomitant logistical and monetary hurdles that industry [\*158] would encounter could significantly affect business decisions, [n207](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092058274&returnToKey=20_T15567034340&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.806187.506591058" \l "n207) and make siting in white communities more attractive than would otherwise be the case if solely technical criteria were employed.

#### This distance between decision makers and disenfranchised communities has created an energy apartheid – ensuring that poor minority communities bear the worst of the risks of energy while receiving few benefits.

Bullard ‘11

Robert D. Bullard is the Dean of the Barbara Jordan-Mickey Leland School of Public Affairs at Texas Southern University in Houston. Dismantling Energy Apartheid in the United States February 9th, 2011 <http://dissidentvoice.org/2011/02/dismantling-energy-apartheid-in-the-united-states/>

Recent proposals to jump-start the nuclear power industry have [sparked debate](http://www.washingtoninformer.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3557:obamas-nuclear-energy-proposal-sparks-debate-among-black-environmentalists&catid=51:national&Itemid=114) and environmental justice concerns among African Americans. Georgia’s mostly African American and poor communities are also being targeted for risky nuclear power plants. For example, the first nuclear power plants to be built in decades are being proposed in Georgia with an [$8.3 billion](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/business/energy-environment/17nukes.html) federal loan guarantee. The loan guarantee will help the Atlanta-based Southern Company build two more nuclear reactors in the mostly African American Shell Bluff community in [Burke County, GA](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burke_County,_Georgia). The county is 51.1 percent black. The two new reactors would each produce 1,000 megawatts, and would work with two existing reactors at a site near [Waynesboro, GA](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBcQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fen.wikipedia.org%2Fwiki%2FWaynesboro%2C_Georgia&ei=nNbqTOO1EIP6lwet1cGcCw&usg=AFQjCNG_ntWN4RSMs-BkM3GDHtBFpuj22A)(62.5% black).¶ Much more research is needed on energy apartheid nationally. More policy analysis is needed to clarify who gets what, when, and why, and where “green” and “clean” energy is headed and where the same old “dirty” energy plants are being proposed and sited across the country. Talking about “going green” is very different from actually going green. Talk is cheap. The time is long overdue to put an end to “energy apartheid” in the United States—where “clean energy” is reserved for the more affluent white Americans and “dirty energy” targeted for poor and people of color.¶ Our [Climate Justice Movement](http://www.weact.org/Coalitions/EJLeadershipForumonClimateChange/tabid/331/Default.aspx) demands that clean, green, and renewable energy be made available to all Americans without regard to race, color, national origin, or income. It is unlikely that we as a nation can achieve sustainability and a green energy future without addressing these equity issues. Too few African American elected officials and leaders from government, business, civil rights, faith-based, academia, and think tank organizations are speaking out against energy apartheid. We need a national summit that brings together diverse sectors and leaders from the African American community to develop a plan of action. This is the right thing to do. And this is the right time to do it. We must speak and do for ourselves and protect our communities if we are to be part of and reap the [benefits](http://www.washpirgstudents.org/reports/energy/energy-reports/a-new-energy-future-the-benefits-of-energy-efficiency-and-renewable-energy-for-cutting-americas-use-of-fossil-fuels2), and not get left behind or on the sideline of a clean energy future.

#### The distance between legitimate and illegitimate decision makers heightens the threat of nuclear holocaust. It is only by beginning to heal the racism inherent in processes like siting nuclear power plants that we can open up space for more diverse wisdom to ease tensions.

Anthony ‘95

Carl Anthony is the Executive Director of the Urban Habitat Program and the chair of the East Bay Conversion Reinvestment Commission Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Freedom from Annihilation Is a Human Right Spring Summer 1995 <http://urbanhabitat.org/node/945>

Nuclear weapons are tools of a conquering, violent culture. Racism at domestic and international levels heightens the potential vulnerability and miscalculation surrounding nuclear proliferation. Few people of color have had any role in debate, development, or decision-making about the goals of this brutal technology. In a nuclear holocaust whole populations will be vaporized in the flash of an eye. People deciding the appropriateness of such a choice inevitably would bring their prejudices and fears to the devastating decision to annihilate whole peoples. The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of a Eurocentric technological elite, paranoid about the aims and aspirations of the majority of the world's population—people of color—magnifies the potential for global disaster. The great and growing gulf of human communication between the rich and poor, European and non-European, multiplies the potential antagonism that could result in planetary holocaust. In this context organizing against nuclear proliferation is, by definition, a multicultural effort, bringing the intelligence and wisdom of every community to the global task of defeating the excesses of racism, human aggression, and technology-gone-berserk.

### Neoliberal Epistemology

#### The nuclear industry drives siting decisions. Upper socioeconomic neighborhoods cause too much political trouble and land is too expensive. The desire for an easy and efficient process papers over the violence done to low income and minority communities when risky technology is placed in their neighborhoods without their involvement.

Foster ‘98

Sheila Foster Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law ARTICLE: Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement 86 Calif. L. Rev. 775 July 1998

Although the siting process does not produce the structured inequalities in communities such as Chester, it is heavily dependent upon them. Conventional industry wisdom counsels private companies to target sites that are in neighborhoods "least likely to express opposition" - poorly educated and lower socioeconomic neighborhoods with little if any commercial activity. [n98](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n98)Communities such as Chester possess many of these characteristics. This is due in part to historical zoning practices and their segregative effects. [n99](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n99) This racialization of space "reaches to the societal processes in which people participate and to the structures and institutions that people produce." [n100](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n100) Residential location, for instance, is seen as an indication of the attitudes, values, and behavioral inclinations of the types of people who are assumed to live there. [n101](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n101) Moreover, segregation has intense political and economic consequences, particularly for poor African Americans and Latinos living in inner-cities. [n102](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n102) Segregated communities are not only geographically isolated,  [\*800]  but socially and culturally isolated. This isolation, in turn, leads to economic and political marginalization. [n103](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n103) Accordingly, the political process rarely takes the concerns of such communities seriously, and decision-makers often ignore them altogether. [n104](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n104)¶ The hazardous waste siting process begins with the private sector choosing an appropriate site for the location of a proposed facility. Because the proposed location of a hazardous waste facility near, particularly, a white, upper-socioeconomic neighborhood often engenders strong public opposition, there is a limited supply of land on which to site such facilities. [n105](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n105) Inevitably, the siting process focuses on industrial or rural communities, many of which, like Chester, have predominantly minority populations. [n106](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n106) These areas are attractive to industries seeking [\*801] to reduce the cost of doing business because land values are lower in heavily industrial and rural communities. [n107](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n107) Furthermore, these communities are presumed to pose little threat of political resistance due to their subordinate socioeconomic, and often racial, status. [n108](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n108)¶ The state both mediates and legitimizes the dependence of private decision-makers on structural inequalities in choosing facility sites. Even though private decision-makers must seek permits from state agencies, there are often no formal criteria which take into account the siting processes' reliance on structural inequalities; [n109](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n109) too often state agencies passively acquiesce to industry siting decisions. [n110](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n110) Aside from [\*802] technical siting criteria and lax public notice requirements, [n111](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n111) the permitting decision is almost entirely in the discretion of state administrative agencies. [n112](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n112) Unfortunately, state agencies determine a proposed facility's impact on the community in a vacuum, rarely looking beyond the geological and environmental characteristics of the proposed site. [n113](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204#n113) Rarely is there any formal assessment of the demographics, health problems, quality of life and infrastructure of the surrounding community, or the synergistic environmental or health effects of other facilities in the area. [n114](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204" \l "n114) When the siting process is neutral toward these structural inequalities it, in effect, perpetuates the injustice of the current social structure. [n115](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1348092116478&returnToKey=20_T15567037690&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-23.98712.21379808204" \l "n115) The end result of environmental decision-making processes, particularly in communities such as Chester, is not that people "come to the hazard," but rather that "the hazard comes to them."

#### Advocating building nuclear plants in privileged areas places us in the role of the writer activist – opening up space for disenfranchised communities to resist and be heard.

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 40-42)

In 2009, amidst the global economic crash, Matt Taibbi memorably depicted Goldman Sachs as a "great vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that smells like money.” Within a year his deepwater image of life-sucking avarice would seem an uncanny foreshadowing of petroleum giant BP. Indeed, Taibbi's vampire squid achieved such popular resonance, I would suggest, because it gave emotional definition to an age, over and above the tentacular reach of any specific transnational corporation. An era of imperial overreach has brought to crisis a Washington Consensus ideology premised on globalizing the "free market" through militarization, privatization, deregulation, optional corporate self-policing, the undertaxation of the super wealthy, ever-more arcane financial practices, and a widening divide separating the gated uber-rich from the unhoused ultrapoor within and between nations. Together these practices have heightened capitalism's innate tendency to abstract in order to extract, intensifying the distancing mechanisms that make the sources of environmental violence harder to track and multinational environmental answerability harder to impose. Such distancing mechanisms include the rhetorical gulf between development as a grand planetary dream premised on growth-driven consumption and its socicevironmental fallout; the geographical distance between market forces as, to an almost occult degree, production has become disaggregated from consumption; and the temporal distance between short-lived actions and long-lived consequences, as gradual casualties are spread across a protracted aftermath, during which the memory and the body count of slow violence are diffused-and defused-by time. Yet memory loss is unevenly inhabited. Whether through sustained activism or more sporadic protests, resource rebels and the environmentally disenfranchised have mobilized repeatedly against memory loss, refusing to see their long-term livelihoods abstracted into oblivion, be it through state violence, transnational corporate rapacity, or some combination of the two. The resource rebels who rise up (or dig in for the long haul) express ambitions that may be difficult to achieve but, in the scheme of things, are typically not grand: some shelter from the uncertainties of hunger; some basic honoring of established patterns of agroforestry, fishing, hunting, planting, and harvesting; access to clean water; some prospects for their children; some respect for the cultural (and therefore environmental) presence of the guiding dead. And, if one accepts as a given that traditions are always mutable, resource rebels seek some active participation in the speed and character of cultural change. Failing all that, the rebels may seek compensation directed not at the nation at large (always an unequal abstraction) but at those most intimately affected by the defacement of the living land by the boardrooms of faceless profiteers. The fraught issue of compensation connects directly with the infrastructural failures of the state: insurrectionary anger is repeatedly stoked when a community experiences technological modernization as extractive theft without service delivery. Under such circumstances, visible reminders of theft through modernity's infrastructural invasions-by oil pipelines or massive hydroelectric dams or toxic tailings from mines-foment rage at life-threatening environmental degradation combined with the state's failure to provide life-enabling public works." Often, as a community contends with attritional assaults on its ecological networks, it isn't granted equitable access (or any access at all) to modernity's basic infra structural networks- piped clean water, a sewage system, an electric grid, a public transport grid, or schools-utilities that might open up alternatives to destitution. Such communities, ecologically dispossessed without being empowered via infrastructure, are ripe for revolt. Like those Niger Delta villages where children for decades had no access to electricity for studying at night, while above their communities Shell's gas flares created toxic nocturnal illumination. Too dark for education, too bright for sleep: modernity's false dawn. Writers who align themselves with resource rebellions may help render decipherable the illegible distance between a far-off neoliberal ideology and its long-lasting local fallout. Such writers may serve as portes-paroies in an economic order premised on acute inequities in portability-of commodities, factories, jobs, people, and the environment itself. Writer-activists may thereby help expose injustices arising from the global freedom of movement afforded powerful corporations and the Bretton Woods institutions, while swathes of humanity are so ecologically undermined that they are abandoned to the plight of the stationary displaced. Whether as part-instigators or as amplifiers, writer-activists can strive to advance the causes of those who confront turbo-capitalism's assaults on the resources that shape their survival. In confrontations between such typically unequal forces, determined hope is mixed with what John Berger, in the spirit of Antonio Gramsci, has called "undefeated despair.""

#### Market forces alone cannot explain the environmental justice problems with nuclear sites, only bringing epistemological questions to the fore can create reflexivity

Rodrik ‘11

(Dan, Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard University, “Occupy the classroom?”, 16 Dec 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/2011121494147161362.html)

Consider the global financial crisis. Macroeconomics and finance did not lack the tools needed to understand how the crisis arose and unfolded. Indeed, the academic literature was chock-full of models of financial bubbles, asymmetric information, incentive distortions, self-fulfilling crises, and systemic risk. But, in the years leading up to the crisis, many economists downplayed these models' lessons in favour of models of efficient and self-correcting markets, which, in policy terms, resulted in inadequate governmental oversight over financial markets. In my book The Globalization Paradox, I contemplate the following thought experiment. Let a journalist call an economics professor for his view on whether free trade with country X or Y is a good idea. We can be fairly certain that the economist, like the vast majority of the profession, will be enthusiastic in his support of free trade. Now let the reporter go undercover as a student in the professor's advanced graduate seminar on international trade theory. Let him pose the same question: Is free trade good? I doubt that the answer will come as quickly and be as succinct this time around. In fact, the professor is likely to be stymied by the question. "What do you mean by 'good'?" he will ask. "And good for whom?" The professor would then launch into a long and tortured exegesis that will ultimately culminate in a heavily hedged statement: "So if the long list of conditions I have just described are satisfied, and assuming we can tax the beneficiaries to compensate the losers, freer trade has the potential to increase everyone's well-being". If he were in an expansive mood, the professor might add that the effect of free trade on an economy's growth rate is not clear, either, and depends on an altogether different set of requirements. A direct, unqualified assertion about the benefits of free trade has now been transformed into a statement adorned by all kinds of ifs and buts. Oddly, the knowledge that the professor willingly imparts with great pride to his advanced students is deemed to be inappropriate (or dangerous) for the general public. Economics instruction at the undergraduate level suffers from the same problem. In our zeal to display the profession's crown jewels in untarnished form - market efficiency, the invisible hand, comparative advantage - we skip over the real-world complications and nuances, well recognised as they are in the discipline. It is as if introductory physics courses assumed a world without gravity, because everything becomes so much simpler that way. Applied appropriately and with a healthy dose of common sense, economics would have prepared us for the financial crisis and pointed us in the right direction to fix what caused it. But the economics we need is of the "seminar room" variety, not the "rule-of-thumb" kind. It is an economics that recognises its limitations and knows that the right message depends on the context. Downplaying the diversity of intellectual frameworks within their own discipline does not make economists better analysts of the real world. Nor does it make them more popular

#### Social invisibility causes extinction – produces background of structural violence that makes conflict and environmental collapse inevitable

Szentes ‘8

Tamás Szentes, a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

#### Neoliberal hegemony uses exceptionalism to render its violent side effects invisible, ensuring environmental destruction and global conflict- be suspicious of all their answers because their means of structuring the social field erases vast sectors of the global population from view

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 33-36)

There are signs that the environmental humanities are beginning to make some tentative headway toward incorporating the impact of U.S. imperialism on the poor in the global South-Vitalis's book America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier (2008) is an outstanding instance, as are powerful recent essays by Elizabeth DeLoughrey on the literatures associated with American nuclear colonialism in the Pacific, Susie O'Brien on Native food security, colonialism, and environmental heritage along the U.S-Mexican border, and Pablo Mukherjee's groundbreaking materialist work on Indian environmental literatures,'? Yet despite such vitally important initiatives, the environmental humanities in the United States remain skewed toward nation-bound scholarship that is at best tangentially international and, even then, seldom engages the environmental fallout of U.S. foreign policy head on. What's at stake is not just disciplinary parochialism but, more broadly, what one might call superpower parochialism, that is, a combination of American insularity and America's power as the preeminent empire of the neoliberal age to rupture the lives and ecosystems of non- Americans, especially the poor, who may live at a geographical remove but who remain intimately vulnerable to the force fields of U.S. foreign policy. To be sure, the U.S. empire has historically been a variable force, one that is not monolithic but subject to ever-changing internal fracture. The U.S., moreover, has long been-and is increasingly-globalized itself with all the attendant insecurities and inequities that result. However, to argue that the United States is subject to globalization-through, for example, blowback from climate change-does not belie the disproportionate impact that U.S. global ambitions and policies have exerted over socioenvironmental landscapes internationally. Ecocritics-and literary scholars more broadly-faced with the challenges of thinking through vast differences in spatial and temporal scale commonly frame their analyses in terms of interpenetrating global and local forces. In such analyses cosmopolitanism-as a mode of being linked to particular aesthetic strategies-does much of the bridgework between extremes of scale. What critics have subjected to far less scrutiny is the role of the national-imperial as a mediating force with vast repercussions, above all, for those billions whom Mike Davis calls "the global residuum.'?" Davis's image is a suggestive one, summoning to mind the remaindered humans, the compacted leavings on whom neoliberalism's inequities bear down most heavily. Yet those leavings, despite their aggregated dehumanization in the corporate media, remain animate and often resistant in unexpected ways; indeed, it is from such leavings that grassroots antiglobalization and the environmentalism of the poor have drawn nourishment. As American writers, scholars, and environmentalists how can we attend more imaginatively how can we attend more imaginatively to the outsourced conflicts inflamed by our unsustainable consumerism, by our military adventurism and unsurpassed arms industry, and by the global environmental fallout over the past three decades of American-led neoliberal economic policies? (The immense environmental toll of militarism is particularly burdensome: in 2009, U.S. military expenditure was 46.5 percent of the global total and exceeded by 10 percent the expenditure of the next fourteen highest-ranked countries combined.)" How, moreover, can we engage the impact of our outsized consumerism and militarism on the life prospects of people who are elsewhere not just geographically but elsewhere in time, as slow violence seeps long term into ecologies-rural and urban-on which the global poor must depend for generations to come? How, in other words, can we rethink the standard formulation of neoliberalism as internationalizing profits and externalizing risks not just in spatial but in temporal terms as well, so that we recognize the full force with which the externalized risks are out sourced to the unborn? It is a pervasive condition of empires that they affect great swathes of the planet without the empire's populace being aware of that impact-indeed, without being aware that many of the affected places even exist. How many Americans are aware of the continuing socioenvironrnental fallout from U.S. militarism and foreign policy decisions made three or four decades ago in, say, Angola or Laos? How many could even place those nation-states on a map? The imperial gap between foreign policy power and on-the-street awareness calls to mind George Lamming's shock, on arriving in Britain in the early 1950s, that most Londoners he met had never heard of his native Barbados and lumped together all Caribbean immigrants as Jamaicans.'?' What I call superpower parochialism has been shaped by the myth of American exceptionalism and by a long-standing indifference-in the U.S. educational system and national media-to the foreign, especially foreign history, even when it is deeply enmeshed with U.S. interests. Thus, when considering the representational challenges posed by transnational slow violence, we need to ask what role American indifference to foreign history has played in camouflaging lasting environmental damage inflicted elsewhere. If all empires create acute disparities between global power and global knowledge, how has America's perception of itself as a young, forward-thrusting nation that claims to flourish by looking ahead rather than behind exacerbated the difficulty of socioenvironmental answerability for ongoing slow violence?" Profiting from the asymmetrical relations between a domestically regulated environment and unregulated environments abroad is of course not unique to America, But since World War II, the United States has wielded an unequalled power to bend the global regulatory climate in its favor. As William Finnegan notes regarding the Washington Consensus, "while we make the world safe for multinational corporations, it is by no means clear that they intend to return the favor."? The unreturned favor weighs especially heavily on impoverished communities in the global South who must stake their claims to environmental justice in the face of the Bretton Woods institutions (the World Bank, the IMF), the World Trade Organization, and the G8 (now G20) over which the United States has exercised disproportionate influence. That influence has been exercised, as well, through muscular conservation NGOs (the Nature Conservancy, the World Wild- life Fund, and Conservation International prominent among them) that have a long history of disregarding local human relations to the environment in order to implement American- and European-style conservation agendas. Clearly, the beneficiaries of such power asymmetries are not just American but transnational corporations, NGOs, and governments from across the North's rich nations, often working hand-in-fist with authoritarian regimes.

**It is necessary to constantly create new, updated rules while working within institution. Some violence is always inevitable. The plan creates a tension between preserving memories through documentation, and the creation of something absolutely new.**

**Derrida 94**(in “Deconstruction in a Nutshell by John Caputo, written in 1997”)

What is called "deconstruction"--and I will be very sketchy here, because time does not permit detailed analyses--has never, never opposed institutions as such, philosophy as such, discipline as such. Nevertheless, as you rightly said, it is another thing for me to be doing what I am doing here. Because, however affirmative deconstruction is, it is affirmative in a way that is not simply positive, not simply conservative, not simply a way of repeating the given institution. I think that the life of an institution implies that we are able to criticize, to transform, to open the institution to its own future. The paradox in the instituting moment of an institution is that, at the same time that it starts something new, it also continues something, is true to the memory of the past, to a heritage, to something we receive from the past, from our predecessors, from the culture. If an institution is to be an institution, it must to some extent break with the past, keep the memory of the past, while inaugurating something absolutely new [cf. PdS139/ Points130-131]. So, I am convinced that today, although this program to some extent looks like other, similar programs, it does something absolutely new. The indication of this is found not simply in the structural organization of the program, but in the work, in the content of the work, of those who will run this program, the new themes. The fact, for instance, that the faculty includes such topics as Heidegger or deconstruction indicates that they are not simply reproducing, that they are trying to open something new and something original, something that hasn't been done in that way in other, similar universities or programs. So the paradox is that the instituting moment in an institution is violent in a way, violent because it has no guarantee. Although it follows the premises of the past, it starts something absolutely new, and this newness, this novelty, is a risk, is something that has to be risky, and it is violent because it is guaranteed by no previous rules. So, at the same time, you have to follow the rule and to invent a new rule, a new norm, a new criterion, a new law [cf. FL 50-52/ DPJ23]. That's why the moment of institution is so dangerous at the same time. One should not have an absolute guarantee, an absolute norm; we have to invent the rules. I am sure that the responsibility that is taken by my colleagues, and by the students, implies that they give themselves the new rule. There is no responsibility, no decision, without this inauguration, this absolute break. That is what deconstruction is made of: not the mixture but the tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, and a break. The condition of this performative success, which is never guaranteed, is the alliance of these to newness.

#### And nuclear power is safe –we are not advocating hurting privileged communities just sharing the risks. Safeguards solve and no environmental damage in the US

John Gray. Associate at Perkins Coie. Choosing the nuclear option: the case for a strong regulatory response to encourage nuclear energy development. 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 315-348 (2009).

Additionally, multiple standard safeguards prevent Chernobyl-like nuclear meltdowns in the United States. n98 Chernobyl was an old-generation plant, operated without strong regulation. n99 By contrast, today's nuclear power plants have negative power coefficients of reactivity that prevent runaway reactions. n100 Ceramic uranium fuel pellets prevent problems from high reactor temperatures or corrosion. n101 The fuel's chemical composition also naturally controls the reaction because ninety-six percent of the fuel does not fission, causing the nuclear reaction to slow down as it heats up. n102 Additional safeguards also include water, which slows neutron reactions, [\*333] and zirconium fuel rods, which resist heat, corrosion, and radiation. n103 Finally, even if all other safeguards failed and the reaction overheated, no environmental damage would occur because a steel and concrete containment structure would contain the entire reaction. n104 Plants' outer protections are designed to withstand internal reactions, earthquakes, and even plane crashes; this final safeguard makes Chernobyl-like damage impossible. n10

Our use of institutions like the state realizes our complicity with power and produces agonism- the alternative is a string of “anti’s” that never produce positive change

Newman ‘00,

(Saul, Postdoctoral Fellow @ Macquarie University, Anarchism and the Politics of Ressentiment, muse)

What is the point of this distinction between power and domination? Does this not bring us back to original anarchist position that society and our everyday actions, although oppressed by power, are ontologically separated from it? In other words, why not merely call domination 'power' once again, and revert back to the original, Manichean distinction between social life and power? However the point of this distinction is to show that this essential separation is now impossible. Domination -- oppressive political institutions like the State -- now comes from the same world as power**.** In other words it disrupts the strict Manichean separation of society and power. Anarchism and indeed radical politics generally, cannot remain in this comfortable illusion that we as political subjects, are somehow not complicit in the very regime that oppresses us. According to the Foucauldian definition of power that I have employed, we are all potentially complicit, through our everyday actions, in relations of domination. Our everyday actions, which inevitably involve power, are unstable and can easily form into relations that dominate us. As political subjects we can never relax and hide behind essentialist identities and Manichean structures -- behind a strict separation from the world of power. Rather we must be constantly on our guard against the possibility of domination**.** Foucault says: "My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous...If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism."[[52]](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn52) In order to resist domination we must be aware of its risks -- of the possibility that our own actions, even political action ostensibly against domination, can easily give rise to further domination. There is always the possibility, then, of contesting domination, and of minimizing its possibilities and effects. According to Foucault, domination itself is unstable and can give rise to reversals and resistance. Assemblages such as the State are based on unstable power relations that can just as easily turn against the institution they form the basis of. So there is always the possibility of resistance against domination. However resistance can never be in the form of revolution -- a grand dialectical overcoming of power, as the anarchists advocated. To abolish central institutions like the State with one stroke would be to neglect the multiform and diffuse relations of power they are based on, thus allowing new institutions and relations of domination to rise up. It would be to fall into the same reductionist trap as Marxism, and to court domination. Rather, resistance must take the form of what Foucault calls *agonism* -- an ongoing, strategic contestation with power -- based on mutual incitement and provocation -- without any final hope of being free from it.[[53]](http://208.34.222.250/bin/rdas.dll/RDAS_SVR=muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.3newman.html#fn53) One can, as I have argued, never hope to overcome power completely -- because every overcoming is itself the imposition of another regime of power. The best that can be hoped for is a reorganization of power relations -- through struggle and resistance -- in ways that are less oppressive and dominating. Domination can therefore be minimized by acknowledging our inevitable involvement with power, not by attempting to place ourselves impossibly outside the world of power. The classical idea of revolution as a dialectical overthrowing of power -- the image that has haunted the radical political imaginary -- must be abandoned. We must recognize the fact that power can never be overcome entirely, and we must affirm this by working within this world, renegotiating our position to enhance our possibilities of freedom**.**

#### We control the scale of violence – structural violence is necessary to psychologically prime people for macro-level conflict

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4

(Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn)

(Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematically and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).